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Abstract 
This article compares preferences for Europeanizing thirteen policies among European 
elites, national elites, and public opinion. Elites are more willing to cede national authority in 
sovereignty areas, b ut citizens are more favorable to EU social policies. Are there 
contrasting logics at work? The answer is two-sided. E lites and public preferences are 
similar in that both are least enthusiastic about Europeanizing high-spending policies. Here 
is a common distributional logic: shifting authority could de-stabilize vested interests. 
However, as the single market intensifies labor market volatility, the public seeks to contain 
this distributional risk through selectively Europeanizing market-flanking policies. In contrast, 
elite preferences are consistent with a functional rationale, which conceives European 
integration as an optimal solution for internalizing externalities beyond the national state. 
Zusammenfassung 
Dieser Artikel vergleicht Präferenzen von europäischen Eliten, nationalen Eliten und 
öffentlicher Meinung hinsichtlich der Europäisierung von dreizehn Politikfeldern. Eliten sind 
eher bereit, nationale Autorität in Souveranitätsbereichen abzugeben, aber Bürgerinnen und 
Bürger sind aufgeschlossener gegenüber europäischer Sozialpolitik. Arbeiten hier kontra-
stierende Logiken? Die Antwort ist zweischichtig. Eliten und öffentliche Präferenzen sind sich 
insofern ähnlich, als sie beide am wenigsten enthusiastisch auf die Europäisierung von 
kostenintensiven Politikfeldern reagieren. Dies ist eine verbreitete Verteilungslogik: eine 
Autoritätsverschiebung könnte Eigeninteressen destabilisieren. Da der Binnenmarkt jedoch 
Arbeitsmarktfluktuation intensiviert, strebt die Öffentlichkeit danach, dieses Verteilungsrisiko 
durch selektive Europäisisierung von marktflankierenden Regelungsbereichen einzudäm-
men. Dagegen zeigen sich die Präferenzen von Eliten konsistent mit einem funktionalen 
Prinzip, welches europäische Integration als die optimale Lösung für die Internalisierung von 
Externalitäten über den Nationalstaat hinaus versteht. 
Keywords 
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Time and again, political pundits and scholars stress that the general public is less keen on 
shifting authority to the European level than elites. Elites, it is said, have pushed European 
integration beyond the will of the people. 
How real is the divide between elites and public opinion? There is an extensive literature on 
public perceptions of European integration (Anderson, 1998; Dalton and Eichenberg, 1998; 
Gabel, 1998a,b, 2002; Gabel and Anderson, 2002; Handley, 1981; Hewstone, 1986; 
Inglehart, 1970; Inglehart et al., 1991; Shephard, 1975; Vaubel, 1994; Wessels, 1995). But 
there are few comparisons between public and elite views (Vaubel, 1994). The few data on 
elites usually pertain to a small sector of the elite, and they employ different questions: 
Schmitt and Thomassen (2000) on European parliamentarians, Egeberg (1999) and Beyers 
and Dierickx (1997) on national representations, Hug and König (2002) and Aspinwall (2002) 
on government elites, and Hooghe (2002) on top Commission officials. Here is a case where 
conventional wisdom rests on a weak empirical base. Elite data were rare until the 1996 
national elites survey conducted by EOS Gallup Europe on behalf of the European 
Commission. The entire data set has not been officially released. However, an unofficial 
version, together with my own survey of Commission elites, allows comparison of public 
opinion and elites. 
The standard questions tapping general support for European integration indicate that the 
gap between public and elites is wide. But a more nuanced picture emerges when o ne 
disaggregates European integration into its policy components. Elites and citizens desire to 
shift different policy bundles to the European level.  
Why is that so? Are there separate logics at work? Drawing from recent work in political 
economy, I explore three lines of argument, and I test these using three sets of data. Data on 
European elite preferences come from a survey among top Commission officials, which I 
conducted between February 2001 and February 2002,
1 data on national elites from a 
special elite survey (fieldwork between February and May 1996),
2 and public opinion data 
from Eurobarometer 54.1, released in 2002 (fieldwork in fall 2000; Hartung, 2002). The 
European and national elites’ surveys are one of a kind, and because they were conducted 
five years apart, some caution in comparing the results is warranted. The national elites were 
questioned when the future of EMU and enlargement was still uncertain, while the European 
                                                 
1  Of the 250 director-generals, deputy director-generals, directors, principal advisors, and chefs or deputy chefs 
de cabinet in the European Commission, 93 participated. One-third were face-to-face interviews, and the 
remainder postal surveys. More details on my website. 
2  EOS Gallup drew a representative sample from a database of 22,000 individuals from five elite sectors: elected 
politicians (national and European parliamentarians), senior national civil servants, business and trade union 
leaders, media leaders (including heads of broadcast and print media), and cultural elites (persons playing a 
leading role in the academic, cultural or religious life). The survey was conducted by telephone (N=3778). The 
report (Spence, [1997]) is available on the Commission’s website:  
  http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/top/top_en.htm.  2 — Liesbet Hooghe / Europe Divided? — I H S 
 
elite dataset and Eurobarometer 54.1 were collected after the introduction of EMU and with 
the European Union on course to include eight new members from Central- and Eastern 
Europe (plus Cyprus and Malta).
3  
1. The citizen/elite divide 
The conventional wisdom is that elites are more in favor of European integration than public 
opinion. The standard measures of support for European integration substantiate that view. 
Ninety-three percent of national elites but only 53% of public opinion think that their country’s 
EU membership is on balance a good thing. Eighty-nine percent o f national elites believe 
that their country has benefited from EU membership, but only 52% of public opinion do so. 
There is a gulf between the public and elites. 
These are aggregate questions measuring something akin to Easton’s (1965) notion of 
affectiv e support, or Scharpf’s (1999) notion of input legitimacy (Gabel 1998a; Green 2001). 
From time to time, Eurobarometer also carries a more concrete question, which asks 
respondents how they want to distribute authority between the European Union and national 
governments. This question is posed for individual policies. It is also included in the national 
elite survey and in the survey of top Commission officials. The virtue of this question is that it 
provides a more fine-grained measure of preferences. Rather than affective support, it taps 
policy-specific, utilitarian support, or in Scharpf’s terms, the European Union’s output 
legitimacy.
4 
Let us start by averaging preferences across the thirteen policies for which we have 
comparable data (Table 1). There is a difference between elites and the public, but it is not 
large. The mean level of support among Commission officials is 65%, against 56% for 
                                                 
3  I also analyze Eurobarometer 46.0 (fieldwork in the fall of 1996), the timing of which coincides with the national 
elites survey. This survey offers a list of policies that is near-identical to the one in used 2000. The results for 
1996 are not significantly different from those for 2000 (see Table 3 and appendix). 
4  Question 30 in Eurobarometer 54.1 reads: ‘For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should 
be made by the (nationality) government, or made jointly within the European Union? 1=nationality, 2=jointly 
within the European Union, 3=don’t know.’ The question formulation for national elites and Commission officials 
differs slightly from that for public opinion, in that it allows respondents to indicate, in addition to the direction, 
also the degree of support or opposition: ‘To what extent should each of the following policy areas be decided at 
the national or regional level and to what extent at the European level? We have a scale from 1 to 10. ... The 
scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are.’ So elite responses are on a 10-point scale, 
and public opinion data are binary. The appendix provides the raw scores. To be comparable, the data need to 
be transformed. Any transformation necessitates explicit assumptions about an imperfectly known response 
distribution. The most convincing transformation strategy consists of reducing the elite data into a binary 
categorization, that is, for each policy, one counts the proportion of elite respondents who prefer the policy to be 
primarily a European responsibility. This figure expresses a simple idea  – that the fundamental choice is 
whether an issue should be primarily national or European. I have repeated the analysis with more complex 
transformations, and have found results across groups and policies to be quite robust. I H S — Liesbet Hooghe / Europe Divided? — 3 
national elites, and 53 % for the public. This overall difference is significant for Commission 
elites and public opinion, but not for national elites and public opinion.  
Table 1:  Support for EU policies:  Proportion of Commission elites, national elites, 
public opinion in favor 
  Commission Elites National Elites  Public Opinion 
mean for all policies  64.7  55.6  53.0 
currency  97.8  78.4  57.5 
humanitarian aid/ third 
world  93.5  70.9  65.1 
foreign policy  92.4  64.3  71.6 
immigration and asylum  90.3  67.9  44.4 
environment  89.1  75.2  58.8 
agriculture  82.4  56.0  48.5 
defense  68.8  64.5  43.6 
research & development  64.5  64.6  69.2 
regional policy  50.0  32.4  65.3 
employment  41.3  52.0  49.6 
social inclusion  29.3  40.7  62.1 
health policy  22.8  29.6  30.2 
education  18.3  25.7  29.8 
high politics 
1  88.6  69.2  55.1 
social model 
2  54.8  53.0  61.0 
redistribution
3  53.9  43.0  58.6 
1  High politics issues consist of currency, humanitarian aid/ third world, foreign policy, defense policy, and 
immigration and asylum. 
2  Social model policies include environment, employment policy, social inclusion, regional policy, and research. 
3  Redistribution consists of agriculture, regional policy, and social inclusion. 
Once one disaggregates European integration into its component policies, the conventional 
view that elites lead citizens in support for integration dissolves. Commission o fficials and 4 — Liesbet Hooghe / Europe Divided? — I H S 
 
national elites lead public opinion in seven policy areas, while public opinion is more 
favorable to the following policy areas: social inclusion, regional policy, health, research, and 
education. The public also leads Commission elites (but not national elites) on employment 
policy, and it leads national elites (but not the Commission) on foreign policy. This is 
illustrated in Figure 1. In immigration policy, at the extreme left, the difference between 
national elite support (67.9%) and public support (44.4%) is 24%. In regional policy, at the 
extreme right, the public (65.3%) leads national elites (32.4%) by 33%. These differences are 
significant.
5 
Can one summarize these differences in a meaningful way? One bundle of policies stands 
out on the left of Figure I: most of these policies are ‘high politics,’ that is, they are concerned 
with core sovereignty, including immigration, foreign policy, defense, monetary policy. Public 
support for integration in these policy areas is exceeded by national elites (14%) and by 
Commission elites (33%). The policies that dominate on the right of Figure I, where public 
support for Europeanization is higher than elite support, concern market regulation and 
redistributive policies. The citizen lead in redistributive policies (agriculture, regional policy, 
and social inclusion) ranges from 5% with Commission officials to 16% with national elites. 
For social model policies (environmental regulation, employment policy, social inclusion, 
regional or cohesion policy, and research and development), the citizen lead varies between 
6% for Commission and 8% for national elites.
6 The label “social model” summarizes policies 
identified by former Commission president Jacques Delors as policies flanking the single 
market, which, if implemented at the EU level, would distinguish “Europe’s social model” 
from Anglo-Saxon liberal capitalism (Delors 1992; see also Ross 1995). Figure 2 shows that 
there is considerable structure in the differences between elite and public preferences. 
                                                 
5  One-way ANOVA compare means test for group differences show that, as concerns average support for 
Europeanization, group differences between Commission and public, and between Commission and national 
elites are significant (p=.008), while those between national elites and public are insignificant (p=1.000). As 
concerns support for Europeanization by policy, almost all group differences tests are highly significant. Of the 
26 group difference tests between Commission and public and between national elites and public, 20 are 
significant at .001 level, 1 at .01 level, 1 at .05 level, and 4 are insignificant (p>.05). According to the Gabriel 
test, only one group difference is insignificant. Bonferroni and Tukey are the most commonly used tests when 
variances are equal, and I report here and below the most conservative results. Where different, I also report 
the Gabriel test, which takes into account unequal group sizes. (The statistical package used for all analyses is 
SPSS 11.5.) 
6  For the three sets of policies, differences between national elites and public are significant at the .001 level. The 
differences between Commission and public are highly significant for high politics, but less pronounced for 
‘social model’ policies (p=.01 with the Gabriel test and p=.08 with Bonferroni/Tukey), and redistributive policies 
(p=.08 with the Gabriel test but p=.22 with Bonferroni/Tukey.)  I H S — Liesbet Hooghe / Europe Divided? — 5 
Figure 1: Relative support for EU policies: elite lead vs. public lead (%) 
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Figure 2:  Relative support for Europeanizing policy bundles: elite lead vs. public  
lead (%) 
There is a clear bottom line. When one asks in principle whether European integration is a 
good idea, elites are much more favorably inclined than the public. However, when one asks 
concretely what kind of policies national or European governments should be responsible for, 
elites are not significantly more favorable to European integration than the public. Yet elites 
and the public want different things from Europe.  
Redistribution
Social Model
ALL POLICIES
High Politics
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
L
e
a
d
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
E
l
i
t
e
 
L
e
a
d
4
0
2
0
0
-
2
0
-
4
0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
L
e
a
d
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
E
l
i
t
e
 
L
e
a
d
 
Commission 
minus Public 
National 
Elites minus 
Public I H S — Liesbet Hooghe / Europe Divided? — 7 
2. Lines of argument on the double-edged divide 
Table 2 presents elite and public opinion rankings – priority-lists – for European integration. 
How can one explain differences across these rankings? Is there a single overarching logic? 
Table 2: Priority-lists of European integration Commission, national elites, public 
opinion 
  Commission elites  national elites  public opinion 
currency  currency  foreign policy 
Third World aid  environment  research 
foreign policy  Third World aid  regional policy 
immigration  immigration  Third World aid 
environment  research   social inclusion 
agriculture  defense  environment 
defense  foreign policy  currency 
research  agriculture  employment 
regional policy  employment  agriculture 
employment  social inclusion  immigration 
social inclusion  regional policy  defense 
health  health  health 
highest 
 
 
lowest 
education  education  education 
The dotted lines (---) indicate where approximately 70% (upper line) or 50% (lower line) of respondents 
favor European integration; policies above the line obtain higher support, and policies below lower 
support.  
Social model policies are in bold.  
Correlations: Commission with national elites: .87 (p=.00); Commission with public opinion: .40 (p=.17);  
national elites with public opinion: .31 (p=.30) 
My analysis departs from conventional analyses of preferences on European integration. 
First of all, I am interested in understanding variation in the pattern of support across EU 
policies. Most existing research seeks to explain variation in the overall level of support. 
Furthermore, my objective is to analyze the gap between elites and public opinion, and so I 
focus on intergroup differences rather than intra-group variation. I use therefore aggregate 
data – for each of these thirteen policies, the proportion of Commission elite, national elite, or 
public opinion supporting Europeanization – not individual-level data. 
Under what conditions does one desire to disperse authority away from the central state? 
What is the attraction of multi-level governance, and how are preferences about multi-level 8 — Liesbet Hooghe / Europe Divided? — I H S 
 
governance formed? This has been the subject of extensive research by economists and 
political scientists. The thrust of much normative analysis is about achieving pareto-
optimality; policies should be allocated at multiple governmental levels because it is efficient 
to do so. Positive analyses, in contrast, tell us that pareto-optimality is rarely achieved. A 
major reason is that distributional concerns often motivate decisions of authoritative 
allocation. Drawing on these traditions, I distill three lines of thinking on why elites and public 
opinion may want to shift some policies to the European level, while maintaining other 
policies at the national level. And I consider how these motivations could affect elites and 
public opinion differently. 
2.1 Functionality  
My first hypothesis takes up the functional argument for distributing policies between the 
national and EU level.  
Scholars of international relations, federalism, public policy, local government, and EU 
studies have grappled with a strikingly similar question: under what conditions is authority 
diffused from the central (national) state upwards or downwards? Notwithstanding many 
differences in approach, there is a broad consensus that the dispersion of authority across 
multiple levels of authority is more efficient than centralization (Hooghe and Marks, 
forthcoming). This functional rationale underlies Wallace Oates’ Theorem of Decentralization: 
‘The provision of public services should be located at the lowest level of government 
encompassing the relevant benefits and costs’ (Oates 1999: 1122). Centralization is 
desirable, if and only if, there are economies of scale or externalities that should be 
internalized. A political economy literature applies this thinking to the European Union 
(Alesina, Angeloni, and Schuknecht, 2001; Casella and Frey, 1992; Kölliker, 2001).  
My first hypothesis is, therefore, that elites and citizens desire Europeanization if and when it 
is functional. The leitmotiv of the functional argument is straightforward: one should adjust 
the scope of a jurisdiction to the scope of the policy problem. If a policy has benefits or costs 
encompassing other European countries, then one should Europeanize it. Europeanization 
may be advantageous to maximize economies of scale, as in defense, monetary policy or 
foreign policy. Or it may be desirable to internalize negative externalities, as in the cases of 
environmental pollution or immigration policy. Where such economies of scale or policy 
externalities are weak, say in education or health policy, the relevant jurisdiction is national 
(or regional or local).  
Functional arguments appear well-ensconced among Europe’s elites. Jean Monnet and his 
successors argued for integration on the particular merits of the policy. This is the basis of 
European integration. In recent years, functional pressures have been expressed in the 
concept of subsidiarity. This principle, which is written in the Treaty of the European Union, I H S — Liesbet Hooghe / Europe Divided? — 9 
enjoins the institutions of the European Union to act in areas of concurrent competence ‘only 
if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States’. European institutions should refrain from acting, even when constitutionally 
permitted to do so, if their objectives could effectively be achieved at or below the national 
level. In practice, the Commission is required to submit written argumentation outlining why 
an EU action is necessary – not why it is politically desirable.  
This functional thinking appears present among top Commission officials (Hooghe, 2002). 
There is also evidence that it may influence the permanent representations and the Council 
working groups, which bring thousands of national civil servants, experts and interest 
representatives, into regular contact with ‘Brussels’ (Jörges and Neyer, 1997; Lewis, 1998; 
Egeberg, 1999; for a qualified view Franchino, 2000). 
Ordinary citizens are far removed from Brussels decision making, and the functionalist logic 
that undergirds it. Yet Wallace Oates’ Theorem may summarize a folk wisdom. If ordinary 
citizens are able to distinguish the extent to which policies have externalities or economies of 
scale, they may be inclined to adopt a functional logic. 
However, it is not easy to operationalize the functional logic of policy externalities, 
transaction costs, and economies of scale (Alesina, Angeloni, Schuknecht, 2001; Tallberg, 
2002; Wessels and Kielhorn, 1995; Scharpf, 1999; Kölliker, 2001; Sandholtz and Stone 
Sweet, 1998; Weber and Hallerberg, 2001). Measuring externalities or economies of scale is 
not an exact science. A promising approach is Wessels and Kielhorn’s (1995) effort to tap 
crossborder externalities in the EU by distinguishing between externalities (and economies 
of scale) due to policy problems that traverse borders naturally (e.g. pollution, defense), and 
externalities arising because prior integration has reduced national capabilities (e.g. how 
liberalization of capital constrains monetary policy). This reasoning appears consistent with 
Fritz Scharpf’s (1999) concept of constraints on national problem-solving capabilities.  
This ordinal Functionality variable takes on a value of 1 for policies with low externalities or 
economies of scale, 2 for medium and 3 for high externalities/scale economies. Wessels and 
Kielhorn allocate values of 1 for education, health, regional policy, social inclusion, and 
employment policy; 2 for research and development; and 3 for environment, defense, foreign 
policy, third world aid, immigration, currency, and agriculture. These judgments have by and 
large face validity, perhaps with the exception of regional and social policy. National policies 
of regional development in an EU-wide single market could create negative externalities 
because differential public investments may divert investment. Differential social inclusion 
policies could create externalities when states with a limited social policy foist their social 
problems onto neighboring, less tightfisted governments. I increase the estimate for regional 
and social policy from 1 to 2. These scores are by and large consistent with Alesina et al.’s 
(2001) empirical evaluations of EU policies on a two-point scale (R=.67). 10 — Liesbet Hooghe / Europe Divided? — I H S 
 
2.2 Distributional logic I: government spending  
The consequences of shifting authority are not limited to pareto-optimality. Shifting authority 
often has distributional implications. How might such  cost/benefit perceptions influence 
preferences for Europeanization? I apply two lines of thinking in recent political economy to 
elite/public preferences on European integration. 
The distributional risk of shifting some policies to the European Union may simply be too 
great. That may be especially so for policies with big financial outlays from state to citizens. 
In many Western European countries, distributional policies arose from decades of political 
conflict between labor and capital, center and periphery, or one religious group and another 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens 1992). Many of 
these policies have deep historical roots, and their continuation is intimately connected with 
the political power of vested interests  in society. By 2002, these distributive policies 
absorbed on average 47% of national GDP in the fifteen EU-countries. There are many 
interests with a stake in these policies.  
Tinkering with jurisdictional authority on distributional policies could destabilize the status 
quo. Shifting such policies, or chunks of them, to the EU level, may re-open distributional 
debates. This will be resisted by interests vested in the status quo (Pierson 1994).  
Shifting authority for a policy also carries more mundane risks. New administrations have to 
be set up, resources allocated, and procedures structured. Policy change stirs things up, and 
this may disrupt policy delivery.  Ordinary citizens have practical reasons for avoiding 
Europeanization of these policies.  Would schools get their funding on time; who would 
reimburse hospital expenses? For elites, the cost of disrupted policy delivery is less direct, 
but they can be held accountable by the public. I hypothesize therefore that public and elites 
may be least enthusiastic in Europeanizing policies with big spending programs. 
To evaluate whether citizens or elites wish to avoid integration of such policies, I assign to 
each policy a score based on its average Government Spending as percentage of GDP for 
the 14 largest EU  countries in 2000. This ordinal variable ranges from a value of 1 for 
policies with minimal government spending to a value of 5 for high-budget policies.
7 
                                                 
7  I follow the COFOG classification (Classifications of the Functions of Government), last revised in 1999 by the 
United Nations (see www.un.org/Depts/unsd/class.htm). For comparable data for all EU countries, I rely heavily 
on a recent Commission report (2002), pp. 71–92, which provides credible estimates for the bulk of policies for 
all EU countries except Luxembourg. I complement these data with my own estimates for regional policy (not a 
separate category in COFOG; source: European Commission (2000)), third world aid (OECD figures), foreign 
policy, currency policy, and immigration policy (own extrapolations from national accounts). The categories are 1 
for x < 0.1% of GDP (currency, foreign policy); 2 for 0.1<= x < 0.5% of GDP (immigration, third world aid); 3 for I H S — Liesbet Hooghe / Europe Divided? — 11 
2.3 Distributional logic II: social model 
The above rationale makes sense as long as these spending programs are stable in the face 
of global pressures. But are they? That is debated among political economists who study 
how increased trade and capital mobility affect the capacity of governments to regulate 
market forces. While few believe that globalization inevitably shrinks national spending 
programs, there is broad consensus that it constrains certain policy instruments, particularly 
taxation, and social or process regulation (Huber and Stephens, 2001; Scharpf, 1999, 2000).   
Trade liberalization and capital mobility also intensify economic insecurity. They increase 
substitutability of labor, and as a result, jobs become more insecure and wage differentials 
grow (Rodrik, 1997). Some policy analysts, including the American economists Dani Rodrik 
and Paul  Krugman, have proposed a ‘global institutional mini-settlement,’ that is, global 
political regulation to mitigate insecurity caused by global capitalism. 
European integration is – among other things – an advanced form of trade liberalization and 
capital mobility, in which many citizens stand to lose. Jacques Delors responded to this by 
promising that the EU would cushion the negative effects of increased market competition. In 
his speeches and writings, he explains how this requires policies that flank the single market 
(Delors, 1992; Ross, 1995; Hooghe and Marks, 1999). The list of policies was never fixed 
once and for all, but the core consists of regional policy, employment, social policy, industrial 
relations, environmental regulation, and some capacity for industrial policy.  
Perceptions of economic insecurity have increased over the past fifteen years, and economic 
data confirm that these perceptions by and large have an empirical basis (Gallie and 
Pauman, 2002; Rodrik, 1997; Scheve and Slaughter, 2002). Many citizens connect feelings 
of insecurity to economic internationalization. The distributional risk of keeping some policies 
at the national level may simply be too great. I hypothesize therefore that citizens would want 
to selectively shift some policies to the European level. The social model logic provides an 
amendment to the government spending logic set out above. 
I use a dichotomous variable Social Model, which takes on a value of 1 for the five policies 
singled out as central to regulated capitalism: employment, social inclusion, regional policy, 
environment, and research and development.   
                                                                                                                                          
0.5<= x <1.5% of GDP (agriculture, environment, regional policy, research); 4 for 1.5<= x <4.5% of GDP 
(defense, employment); 5 for x => 4.5% of GDP (education, health, social inclusion). 12 — Liesbet Hooghe / Europe Divided? — I H S 
 
3. Functionality and distribution 
How do these lines of argument fare in explaining variation in desired Europeanization? Is 
the same logic at work for elites and public, or are there different logics? I report bivariate 
correlations in the appendix, and multivariate regression results in Table 3. The last two 
columns in Table 3 indicate that the results for the 1996 public are very similar to those for 
the 2000 public.  
Table 3: Should a policy be Europeanized? Explaining variation in support for EU 
policies (OLS regressions) 
  Commission 
elites 
national 
elites
a 
public opinion 
 2000
a 
public 0pinion 
1996 
Constant  53.50*** 
(15.43) 
13.02 
(10.94) 
70.25*** 
(5.53) 
73.44*** 
(17.61) 
functionality  18.81*** 
(3.87) 
17.66*** 
(4.06) 
-   0.92 
(4.41) 
government spending   -10.34** 
(2.33) 
-   -7.45*** 
(1.67) 
-8.12** 
(2.66) 
social model      .96 
(4.58) 
4.65 
(6.86) 
17.57** 
(4.62) 
12.77* 
(5.22) 
R
2  .95***  .66**  .73***  .72** 
adjusted R
2  .93***  .59**  .68***  .62** 
N  13  13  13  13 
*** p =.001  
** p =.01  
* p = .05   
Note: Unstandardized coefficients, with standard errors in brackets. 
a  The national elite and public opinion 2000 models are best models, not full models, to minimize distortion of 
estimates as a result of multi-collinearity. I H S — Liesbet Hooghe / Europe Divided? — 13 
3.1 Functional logic 
The views of European and national elites are consistent with the Functionality hypothesis. 
Correlations between this variable and Commission and national elites’ preferences are .91 
and .80 respectively. Elites appear to internalize the view that one should shift policies with 
negative externalities or economies of scale to the European level. Jean Monnet would have 
nodded approvingly; elite preferences are consistent with a desire to find optimal solutions to 
problems. 
The fit is markedly poorer for public opinion: the correlation is positive, as expected, but falls 
short of significance (R=.46).  
Why is there a difference between elites and the public? I conjectured above that citizens 
may be open to the functional logic – provided they understand the complex argument about 
functionality. Research on public support for European integration has shown that the more 
individuals know about the European Union, the more they support it (Gabel, 1998a). Could 
political sophistication also shape the pattern of support? If it does, the most sophisticated 
citizens should have preferences similar to those of elites.  
I test this for three different measures of political sophistication: objective knowledge of 
European politics, subjective knowledge, and education,
8 and I find that political 
sophistication generally makes citizens more receptive to functional arguments. For the top-
3% and the top-20% on subjective knowledge, the association between support and 
functionality is .51 (p=.08) and .52 (p=.07) respectively against .41 (p=.17) for the bottom-
20%. Similarly, for citizens with higher education, the correlation is .59 (p=.03) against .44 
(p=.13) for those who finished school at fifteen or younger. The difference is less pronounced 
for objective knowledge. By and large, these results suggest that differences in political 
sophistication account in part for the elite/public gap on functionality, but it does not ice the 
issue. Even for politically sophisticated citizens, the association between support and 
functionality never climbs above .60, and this compares with .91 for European elites and .80 
for national elites.  
                                                 
8  Students of public opinion generally recommend using measures of objective knowledge to gauge political 
sophistication (Zaller 1992: 333–7). Question 24 in Eurobarometer 54.1 asks, for nine EU institutions, ‘Have you 
heard of [European institution]?’, and Q32 reads, ‘On which of the following do you think most of the European 
Union budget is spent?’ I construct an additive index of these ten dichotomous variables, which varies between 
0 (not one right answer) and 10 (knows all institutions, and answers correctly that agriculture is the largest 
category on the EU budget). I also calculate an index of subjective knowledge constructed from Q14, which 
reads, ‘How much do you feel you know about the European Union, its policies, its institutions’ (scale of 1 to 10). 
And I use education as a proxy for political sophistication; Eurobarometer asks respondents at what age they 
finished education. 14 — Liesbet Hooghe / Europe Divided? — I H S 
 
3.2 Distributional logic I: government spending 
Does Government Spending influence preferences on integration? The answer is yes for 
both citizens and elites. The association between citizen support for integration and 
government spending is strongly negative (R=–.59). That means that support for 
Europeanization is lowest for policies with the highest financial flow from state to citizen. 
Government spending is even stronger for elites: R=–.90 for Commission elites and R=–.75 
for national elites.  
How does this distributional logic relate to functionality? It is difficult to answer this question 
definitively, because the number of cases is small (N=13) and the two variables are highly 
correlated (–.74). But there are reasons to believe that the logics work in tandem. The litmus 
test is whether a particular logic works as well within subsets of policies as for all. Thus 
functionality should capture variation within high-spending policies, and it should do so more 
consistently for elites than for the public. In other words, of the subset of high-spending 
policies, policies with low externalities (e.g. social policy) should receive less support for 
Europeanization than those with high externalities (e.g. defense). Conversely, government 
spending should work within the subset of policies with high externalities/economies of scale, 
and it should do so for elites and public alike. Among policies with the same high level of 
externalities, those with higher government spending (e.g. defense) should receive less 
support than those with lower government spending (e.g. foreign policy).  
Table 4:  Interaction between functionality and government spending (partial 
correlations) 
  Commission 
elites
national 
elites 
public 
opinion 
functionality       
all govt. spending categories (N=13)          .91***              .80***  .46 
government spending=high (N=5)       .81
￿           .74  .41 
government spending=low (N=8)         .94***            .65￿  -.46 
government spending        
all functionality categories (N=13)      -.90***           -.75**  -.59* 
functionality=high (N=7)      -.88**        -.38  -.65 
functionality=low/medium (N=6)      -.95**        -.57  -.74
￿ 
*** p =.001  
** p =.01  
* p = .05   ￿ p = .10 I H S — Liesbet Hooghe / Europe Divided? — 15 
Table 4 reports correlations and partial correlations. The first three rows compare 
correlations between government spending and support for all policies, for policies with high 
functionality, and for those with low functionality. The same pattern emerges across the three 
rows. The last three rows repeat this for functionality and support: correlations for all policies, 
for those with high government spending, and  for those with low/medium government 
spending. The associations are very similar, with the partial exception of national elites. 
These results are only indicative, but they do suggest that the factors capture distinct causal 
effects. Functionality does not appear to be a proxy for government spending, and nor 
seems government spending a proxy for functionality. 
3.3 Distributional logic II: social model  
The Social Model hypothesis, with a nod to Jacques Delors, is powerful for understanding 
public views on Europeanization. Here is a subset of issues for which citizens want higher 
than average integration, irrespective of whether these are high- or low-spending policies. 
These are the policies that flank the single market, and which distinguish regulated 
capitalism from market-liberal capitalism: social inclusion, employment, regional policy, 
environment, and research. The social model variable is powerfully and positively associated 
with support for integration. The increase in support is sizeable: social model policies can 
count on average on almost 18% higher support for Europeanization than other policies, 
holding constant the spending character of these policies. The coefficient of determination 
jumps to .73. In contrast, the social model has little bite on elite preferences. Why is this so?  
The social model hypothesis suggests that EU citizens prefer regulated capitalism. This is 
grounded in recent work in comparative political economy. As Iversen and Soskice (2001) 
argue, the demand for social protection – regulated capitalism – is highest among individuals 
who have skills that are specific to a particular firm, industry or occupation. Individuals with 
specialized skills, or – in Iversen and Soskice’s terms – with high asset specificity, are more 
vulnerable to labor market volatility because they cannot easily transport these skills to other 
firms, industries or occupations. Workers and firms will therefore only invest in specialized 
skills, if they receive some protection against labor market risk. Europe’s continental 
economies have relied heavily on employees with high asset specificity. Here lies a rationale 
for continental Europe’s extensive national welfare states and systems of vocational training 
(Iversen and Cusack, 2000; KLMS, 1999; Soskice, 1999). And here rests, in the context of 
European integration, a rationale for social protection at the European level (Brinegar, Jolly, 
Kitschelt, forthcoming). 
Eurobarometer surveys do not provide reliable indicators for individual asset specificity (on 
operationalizing this concept, see Iversen and Soskice, 2001). This makes it quite difficult to 
test the hypothesis that individuals with high asset specificity support regulated capitalism. 
However, a test at the aggregate level shows that the social model is weakest for the UK, 16 — Liesbet Hooghe / Europe Divided? — I H S 
 
where asset specificity is relatively low, and strongest for Scandinavian countries, which 
have high asset specificity.  
Why, then, does this line of thinking not influence Europe’s elites? In contrast to the public, 
the bivariate correlation between social model and support is negative for Commission elites 
(R=-.28) and national elites (R=-.12), and the variables remain insignificant in both 
multivariate models. The Iversen/Soskice argument suggests that there are good personal 
reasons why elites would not support Europeanizing social model policies. Compared with 
the public, elites are characterized by low asset specificity – their high level of education 
provides them with ample opportunity to change jobs or careers. Labor market volatility 
entails much less personal risk for them.  
The mismatch between elites and public is reflected in opinion surveys on economic 
integration. Confronted with the same questions (national elites survey and Eurobarometer 
54.1), the public expresses far greater concern about the destabilizing effects of the single 
currency than national elites. A smaller proportion of citizens thinks EMU would bring faster 
economic growth (38% for public opinion versus 56% for elites) and create more jobs (30% 
versus 42%), and a greater proportion expects higher inflation (31% versus 18%), a 
widening gap between rich and poor (34% versus 18%), and generally more disadvantages 
than advantages (26% versus 14%). 
It is interesting to note that these results are consistent across elite sectors. Elected 
politicians are  not more open to the social model logic, notwithstanding the fact that they 
have incentives to adjust their position to the median voter. Support is weakly and negatively 
associated with the social model variable (R=–.05), which is not meaningfully different from 
the overall elite average (R=–.12). Nor is the multivariate model for political elites different 
from that for all elites: the social model variable is positive but insignificant, while the 
functionality variable is highly significant.  
The results are also quite robust across countries. The association of social model with elite 
support remains for all countries well below the association with public support. In the 
separate national multivariate analyses, social model is insignificant in all but two models: 
the UK (p=.02), and Greece (p=.08), and functionality  is the most consistently powerful 
factor.  
The picture is somewhat different when one divides national elites by ideology. Leftist elites 
are by and large more likely to support the social model than right-leaning elites, which is 
consistent with recent work that examines how ideology structures positioning on European 
integration (Marks, forthcoming). However, they too are considerably less enthusiastic than 
ordinary citizens. The public lead is 6% with left-leaning elites against 10% with right-leaning 
elites. In separate multivariate analyses for the two ideological groups, the social model 
variable is insignificant and functionality highly significant. Moreover, leftist support is not I H S — Liesbet Hooghe / Europe Divided? — 17 
consistently higher for every social model policy. Leftist elites are keener than their rightwing 
colleagues to Europeanize employment, social inclusion and to some extent regional policy, 
but they are no different on environment and research and development. Left-leaning elites 
selectively champion the social model.
9 
The social model logic taps deeply felt distributional effects of European integration. The 
European single market intensifies labor market insecurity for ordinary citizens. This anxiety 
does not lead them to reject the single market altogether. Rather, they appear to want to 
counterbalance it w ith policies  that dampen the negative consequences of increased 
competition. However, elites do not perceive these policies as primarily the European 
Union’s responsibility.  
4. Conclusion 
Is there a divide between elites and public opinion on European integration? The answer is 
yes when one examines principled support for European integration. Elites are by and large 
more Euro-enthusiastic than citizens. Perhaps this indicates that elites are more content than 
the public with the basic rules of the EU polity. But the answer is less unequivocal when one 
poses the practical question of how, in particular policy areas, authority should be distributed 
between the European Union and national governments. The difference between elites and 
public is subtle, but real. Elites desire a European Union capable of governing a large, 
competitive market and projecting political muscle; citizens are more in favor of a caring 
European Union, which protects them from the vagaries of capitalist markets. They support 
different aspects of European integration. 
Are there contrasting logics at work here? The answer is two-sided. E lites and public 
preferences are similar in that both are least enthusiastic about Europeanizing high-spending 
policies such as health, education, or social policy. There is a common distributional logic 
here: shifting authority in these policies could de-stabilize powerful vested interests and 
disrupt policy delivery. However, the public wants to Europeanize market-flanking policies, 
and elites do not. This is where elites and public part ways. As the single market intensifies 
labor market volatility, the public seems intent to contain this other distributional risk through 
selectively Europeanizing policies that flank market integration: employment, social policy, 
cohesion policy, environment, and industrial policy. Elite preferences do not follow this logic. 
Instead, their views are consistent with a functional rationale, which conceives European 
integration as an optimal solution for internalizing externalities beyond the national state and 
                                                 
9  An independent means T -test reveals that average support among left-leaning elites is significantly higher for 
social model policies as a bundle (p=.00), employment policy (p=.00), social inclusion (p=.00), and for regional 
policy (p=.08), but not for research and development (p=.45) and environment (p=.61). 18 — Liesbet Hooghe / Europe Divided? — I H S 
 
for reaping economies of scale. The policies elites want to Europeanize most are the ones 
predicted by functionalism: currency, foreign policy, third world aid, immigration, environment, 
and defense. This logic of functionality does not explain citizens’ preferences. I H S — Liesbet Hooghe / Europe Divided? — 19 
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Appendix 
I. Average Support for Europeanization
1  
 
 
Commission 
Officials  
(10-point 
scale,1–10) 
National Elites 
(10-point scale, 
1–10) 
Public 
Opinion 
(2-point 
scale,1–2) 
Currency  9.5  7.7  1.58 
Humanitarian Aid/ Third World  7.8  7.1  1.65 
Foreign Policy  7.8  6.6  1.72 
Immigration and asylum  7.8  6.9  1.38 
Environment  7.5  7.4  1.59 
Agriculture  7.4  6.2  1.49 
Defense  6.8  6.7  1.44 
Research & Development  6.1  6.7  1.69 
Regional policy  5.6  4.7  1.65 
Employment  5.2  5.9  1.50 
Social Inclusion  4.5  5.3  1.62 
Health Policy  3.8  4.5  1.30 
Education  3.6  4.3  1.30 
Mean for all policies  6.4  6.3  1.53 
1 The higher the average, the greater the support for Europeanizing this policy. 
 
 I H S — Liesbet Hooghe / Europe Divided? — 25 
II. Independent Variables 
  Functionality  Government 
Spending 
Social Model 
Currency                             3  1  0 
Foreign policy                       3  1  0 
Immigration and asylum                  3  2  0 
Humanitarian Aid/ Third World                     3  2  0 
Environment                          3  3  1 
Agriculture            3  3  0 
Defense                       3  4  0 
Research & Development            2  3  1 
Regional policy                      2  3  1 
Social inclusion   2  5  1 
Employment                           1  4  1 
Health                               1  5  0 
Education  1  5  0 
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III. Correlations 
  CEC% NAT% PUB%
2000
PUB%
1996
a
PUB%
1996
b
FUNCTIO-
NALITY
GOV 
SPENDING 
NAT%    .91***   1.00  
PUB% 2000    .50￿   .47   1.00  
PUB% 1996
a    .67*   .59*   .84***   1.00  
PUB% 1996
b    .63*   .56￿   .96***   1.00   1.00  
FUNCTIONALITY    .91***   .80***   .46   .51￿   .51￿   1.00  
GOVSPEND  -.91*** -.75** -.59* -.73** -.69* -.74**   1.00 
SOCIAL MODEL  -.28 -.12   .45   .23   .39 -.30   .26 
*** p = .001  
** p = .01  
* p = .05  
￿ p = .10   
Note: 
a = 13 policies (including “industrial rights” as “social policy”); 
b = 12 policies (excluding “industrial rights”).   
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